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The 18
th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
seems to have opened a new chapter in the history of anticorruption
struggles in the People’s Republic. The dismissal of Li Chuncheng,
deputy Party chief of Sichuan, 22 days after his inclusion as an alternate
member of the Party’s Central Committee illustrates how times have
changed. Never in the past ten years has an alternate member been dis-
missed so quickly. Xi Jinping’s new “eight rules” for rectifying cadres’ behav-
iour – especially the one simplifying the style of official meetings and
limiting extravagance in receptions – also symbolise this trend. (7)
While corruption is an old phenomenon, Ren Zhongyuan notes new ini-
tiatives that came about in 2012. The Party leadership appears increasingly
aware of the extent of the problem and the consequences for its own future
if nothing is done. Besides, some major cases such as the Bo Xilai affair are
particularly highlighted, despite their rarity. Xin Shiji notes that Bo was only
the third Politburo member to be dismissed since 1992. The Internet and
microblogs have a central place in the anticorruption fight, which raises the
issue of the use of such information and its interaction with the CCP’s in-
ternal mechanisms.
Leaders’ awareness and pressure from the
Internet
Given the rising number of cases and steep inflation of sums involved,
corruption among cadres constitutes a major challenge for the Party’s new
leadership. According to Yang Minzhi, former head of the Hunan provincial
discipline inspection commission, the central commission’s report to the
18th Party Congress noted 643,759 corruption cases between November
2007 and June 2012. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’
Blue Book on Fighting Corruption and Upholding Integrity, national-level
supervision organs received as many as 1,345,814 complaints in 2011 alone.
Zhang Weiying notes that on the popular news website Baidu Xinwen,
the number of articles tackling the anticorruption topic rose from 11,900
in 2003 to 76,200 in 2004 and reached 246,000 articles in 2010. Similar
evolution was evident on the People’s Daily website. The number of corrup-
tion cases, measures to deal with the scourge, and media reports on such
affairs has been rising. This coincides with increasing awareness in the top
leadership, as confirmed by former General Secretary Hu Jintao at the 18th
Party Congress, when he declared that corruption was “a matter of life and
death for the Party and the country.” Zhang Weiying comments ironically
on this assessment with a popular formula: “Inaction will kill the country
but the anticorruption campaign will kill the Party.” Even though, to him,
the country is not in danger, it is time to engage in saving the Party through
a frontal attack on corruption in its ranks.
In Zhang’s view, corruption has not only grown exponentially, but its na-
ture has also changed over the past ten years. In the spirit of Kellee Tsai’s
work, Zhang describes the passage from a reforming and value-adding cor-
ruption to a conservative and counterproductive one. (8) In the 1980s and
1990s, corruption consisted to a large extent of citizens “purchasing” the
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influence of cadres as a means of reducing state pressure. Alongside eco-
nomic reforms, such illegal practices helped free up resources to which ac-
cess was limited, and thus facilitated China’s adoption of a market economy
system.
However, since the beginning of the last decade, corruption has slowed
the liberalisation of the economy. Whereas before 2000, corruption helped
entrepreneurs “buy” a certain freedom of action from cadres, today it mostly
takes the form of cadres corrupting other cadres for personal gain. This high-
lights cadres’ persistently crucial role in the economy, especially in land
management and transport, sectors over which the state still retains vast
control and where corruption is rife. Chen Baocheng notes that on 25 De-
cember 2012, Hu Jun, then deputy director of Shanghai’s Municipal Plan-
ning, Land, and Resources Administration, was sentenced to a 15-year jail
term for corruption. He was the third “landlord” (tudi fu 土地爷) in five years
to be dismissed in Shanghai. Such scandals are also rife in public transport
and railway administrations, particularly in Hunan and Henan provinces.
All the authors note the growing role of the Internet in the anticorruption
fight, especially after the 18th Party Congress. Chen observes that in the
months following the Party Congress, three provincial-level cadres have
been dismissed from their positions because of accusations made on the
Internet: Lei Zhengfu, who was Party secretary of Chongqing’s Beibei Dis-
trict; Li Yali, who was deputy director of the public security department of
Shanxi Province and director of the public security bureau of Taiyuan City;
and Dan Zengde, who was deputy director of the Shandong provincial agri-
culture department. Ren Zhongyuan notes that, despite the problem of in-
formation distortion, the Internet helps to widen and speed up the
anticorruption fight in a system where press freedom is circumscribed. In
particular, it helps correct weaknesses in the Party’s anticorruption cam-
paigns that stem from the lack of autonomy of discipline inspection com-
missions, which are attached to Party committees at different
administrative levels.
Institutional remedies
In Zhang Weiying’s view, the most urgent step needed to tackle rising cor-
ruption is an increased effort to go after corrupt cadres and an implemen-
tation of tougher punishments so as to render corruption riskier. Zhang adds
that this should go hand-in-hand with deep reforms, because corruption
accusations are often used as a tool in power struggles. It is then not always
the most corrupt cadres who are arrested; especially when the amounts at
stake are significant and when the number of cadres implicated is large,
leaks are less likely. Zhang calls for raising cadres’ salaries so they are less
tempted by illegal activities. Their incomes should also be published.
Hu Shuli agrees with this idea, noting that this debate surfaced in China in
the 1980s. Since 2009, some 20-odd cities have been chosen to publish
local cadres’ incomes, an experiment modelled on American sunshine laws.
However, Hu adds, the practice has not been made systematic due to the
lack of political backing.
All the authors stress the need for profound systemic reforms towards
greater press freedom and judicial independence as well as the development
of an autonomous structure to carry out the anticorruption campaign.
Yang Minzhi goes the furthest in specifying institutional details. Yang shows
that the issue goes beyond the training or the morality of cadres. In fact, if
some cadres can indulge in illicit activities in a situation of quasi-impunity
for years, as in Bo Xilai’s case, it is because the problem is systemic. Thanks
to the hierarchical system, any control of superior cadres by their subordi-
nates is impossible in practice. The “number one” (yibashou 一把手) at var-
ious administrative levels wields such power over his subordinates’ careers
that they do not dare take the risk of denouncing him. It is at their level
that most corruption occurs, say Ren Zhongyuan and Yang Minzhi, adding
that the situation can only change with the development of intra-Party
democracy.
The current hierarchical structure also raises the issue of the national lead-
ership’s system of responsibility. The Party Congress, drawing more than
2,000 delegates, is theoretically the highest entity in the CCP. However, it
convenes just once every five years, which makes it a mere registration
chamber that only helps select members of the Party Central Committee
without being able to supervise their activities. Yang Minzhi suggests giving
the Party Congress more power and increasing its role between plenary ses-
sions by forming a standing committee that could supervise on a daily basis
the activities of the Party’s Central Committee and Central Discipline In-
spection Commission and be more active in drafting amended legislation
and in the selection of leaders.
Yang also highlights the need to rely on China’s Constitution in order to
limit the Party’s powers. He regrets the impotence of people’s congresses
at various administrative levels. Their role in supervising government activ-
ities at the national or local level often conflicts with Party hierarchy, ren-
dering them obsolete, especially as the head of the local congress generally
also leads the Party committee at the corresponding level.
Often a pioneer in reform matters, Guangdong Province developed a five-
year action plan for strict Party management (Guangdong sheng cong yan
zhi dang wu nian xingdong jihua 广东省从严治党五年行动计划) in 2012,
well before the 18th Party Congress. Echoing the aforementioned challenges,
the plan, while vague in terms of implementation, stresses the issue of the
vast powers enjoyed by local “number-ones.” The Internet’s role in the an-
ticorruption struggle is also highlighted in developing a system to verify the
information collected. More concretely, publication of the income of cadres
and their families is to become the general norm at the provincial level by
2014. The 18th Party Congress gave new momentum to the anticorruption
wave in Guangdong. Chen Baocheng and Wang Jing note that since then, a
large number of cadres have been dismissed from their positions, at least
four of them at the provincial level.
The various articles analysed here sought to open debate on the anticor-
ruption policies adopted at the National People’s Congress plenary session.
The profusion of articles and the freedom with which they are published
indicate that the new leadership will seize the issue head on, especially now
that leaders in Guangdong and Shanghai have publicly called for greater
transparency regarding cadres’ incomes.
z Translated by N. Jayaram.
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